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CLASSIFYING OBESITY AS A DISABILITY UNDER THE
AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT: HOW SEFF V.
BROWARD COUNTY IS INCONGRUENT WITH RECENT
ADA LITIGATION
Maura Flaherty McCoy+
“During the past 20 years, there has been a dramatic increase in obesity in the
United States and rates remain high. More than one-third of U.S. adults (34.9%)
and approximately 17% (or 12.7 million) of children and adolescents aged 2–19
years have obesity.” 1 Largely due to an increase in obesity rates, many
employers have adopted corporate wellness programs in an effort to reduce
insurance claims and improve the productivity and health of their workforce.2
The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, or “Obamacare,” contains
+
J.D. Candidate, May 2015, The Catholic University of America, Columbus School of Law; B.A.,
2004, Georgetown University. The author would like to thank her parents, James and Alice, for
their encouragement and support, and her husband, Matthew, for his unconditional love and
patience. She would also like to thank her Catholic University Law Review colleagues who helped
prepare this Note for publication.
1. Facts, CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, http://www.cdc.gov/
obesity/data/facts.html (last updated Sept. 3, 2014). Obese individuals are identified by a body
mass index outside a certain range, calculated using a person’s weight and height to determine his
amount of body fat. About BMI for Adults, CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION,
http://m.cdc.gov/en/HealthSafetyTopics/HealthyLiving/HealthyWeight/AssessingYourWeight/Bo
dyMassIndex/AboutBMIAdults (last visited Feb. 19, 2015). An adult with a BMI between 25 and
29.9 is considered overweight, and anyone with a BMI of 30 or higher is considered obese. Id. A
2009 study estimated that the medical cost of obesity in America was $147 billion annually and
that medical costs for obese individuals were $1,429 higher per year than people of a normal weight.
Press Release, CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION (July 27, 2009),
http://www.cdc.gov/media/presrel/2009/r090727.htm. In 2009–2010, 35.7 percent of adults in the
United States were obese, and 16.9 percent of children and adolescents were obese. Cynthia L.
Ogden, Margaret D. Carroll, Brian K. Kit & Katherine M. Flegal, Prevalence of Obesity in the
United States, 2009–2010, NAT’L CENTER FOR HEALTH STATISTICS 1–2 (2012), available at
http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/databriefs/db82.pdf. During these years there was no significant
difference between men and women at any age, though women ages sixty and over were more
obese than younger women. Id.
2. Laura Anderko, Jason S. Roffenbendner, Ron Z. Goetzel, Francois Millard, Kevin
Wildenhaus, Charles DeSantis & William Novelli, Promoting Prevention Through the Affordable
Care Act: Workplace Wellness, CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION (Dec. 13, 2012),
http://www.cdc.gov/pcd/issues/2012/12_0092.htm. In addition:
With the passage of the Affordable Care Act (ACA), worksite wellness programs will
become part of a national public health strategy to address the increase in chronic
diseases, which are predicted to cost the US health care system an estimated $4.2 trillion
annually by 2023. Evidence suggests that worksite wellness programs are cost-beneficial,
saving companies money in health-care expenditures and producing a positive return on
investment (ROI).
Id. It is calculated that there is “an average return of $3.27 in medical costs for every dollar spent
on worksite wellness programs.” Id.
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several provisions that promote and help facilitate the implementation of
wellness programs. 3 The American Medical Association (AMA) House of
Delegates recently joined The World Health Organization, the Food and Drug
Administration, and the National Institutes of Health in recognizing obesity as a
disease, which means that roughly one-third of Americans will be classified as
ill.4
Although the AMA’s recent decision is not legally enforceable, 5 and the
AMA opposes the classification of obesity as a disability,6 the resolution raises
the question of how discrimination claims by obese persons will be treated in
the context of employer wellness programs. “The Americans with Disabilities
Act of 1990 [(ADA)] prohibits discrimination and ensures equal opportunity for
persons with disabilities in employment, State and local government services,
public accommodations, commercial facilities, and transportation.”7 The AMA
defines a disease as “an impairment of the normal functioning of some aspect of
the body,” 8 and the ADA defines a disability as “a physical or mental
impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities.” 9 The
treatment of obese individuals in employer wellness programs could be grounds
for discrimination claims under the ADA, depending on how courts choose to
define “disability.”10
Courts’ treatment of what is considered a “disability” has evolved over time,
especially subsequent to the Americans with Disabilities Act Amendments of

3. Id. The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act was passed by Congress in March
2010, with the goal of improving health care coverage for all Americans. Patient Protection and
Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119, 588 (2010) (codified at scattered titles
and sections).
4. See Andrew Pollack, A.M.A. Recognizes Obesity as a Disease, N.Y. TIMES, June 19, 2013,
at B1, B5; Recognition of Obesity as a Disease, AM. MED. ASS’N HOUSE OF DELEGATES (May 16,
2013), available at http://media.npr.org/documents/2013/jun/ama-resolution-obesity.pdf.
5. Pollack, supra note 4, at B1.
6. AM. MED. ASS’N HOUSE OF DELEGATES, supra note 4.
7. Department of Justice, Information and Technical Assistance on the Americans with
Disabilities Act, ADA.GOV, http://www.ada.gov/2010_regs.htm (last visited Sept. 14, 2014); see
42 U.S.C. § 12101 (2012) (providing the purpose of the ADA). The ADA of 1990 was changed by
the ADA Amendments Act of 2008. Department of Justice, supra.
8. AM. MED. ASS’N HOUSE OF DELEGATES, supra note 4. The American Medical
Association’s Council on Science and Public Health identifies a disease as “1) an impairment of
the normal functioning of some aspect of the body; 2) characteristic signs or symptoms; and 3)
harm or morbidity.” Id. The Resolution states that there is significant evidence to show that obesity
is “a multi-metabolic and hormonal disease state” that impairs numerous bodily functions and is
not merely the result of lifestyle choices. Id. The AMA House of Delegates stated, “[t]he
suggestion that obesity is not a disease but rather a consequence of a chosen lifestyle exemplified
by overeating and/or inactivity is equivalent to suggesting that lung cancer is not a disease because
it was brought about by individual choice to smoke cigarettes.” Id.
9. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)(A) (2012).
10. See infra Part III.
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2008. 11 Prior to 2008, the Supreme Court took a limited view of what
constituted a disability and had stricter standards for discrimination.12 The Court
considered mitigating circumstances when evaluating the severity of a
disability13 and interpreted “substantially impairs” and “major life activity” very
broadly to disqualify employees who could not perform specific work tasks.14
Following initial ADA cases, Congress determined that the intent of the ADA
was not being fulfilled and passed an Amendments Act to further clarify the
standards for discrimination.15 The Americans with Disabilities Amendments
Act of 2008 specifically overturned Sutton v. United Air Lines 16 and Toyota
Manufacturing, Kentucky, Inc. v. Williams17 to broaden the scope of coverage
for disabled employees making discrimination claims. 18 Where courts were
once reluctant to classify obesity as a disability except for instances in which
obesity was related to an underlying physiological disorder, 19 the 2008
amendments have led courts to broaden their treatment of obesity as a
disability.20 The new standards for the ADA have coincided with the advent of
employer wellness programs, which are designed to improve employees’ health

11. ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, 122 Stat. 3553 (2008) (codified at
42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–12103, 12111–12114, 12201, 12205–12213; 29 U.S.C. § 705 (2012)). The
ADA was originally enacted against the backdrop of the finding that “43,000,000 Americans have
one or more physical or mental disabilities.” 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(1) (1990) (amended 2008). In
addition, “historically, society has tended to isolate and segregate individuals with disabilities.” 42
U.S.C. § 12101(a)(2). The ADA sought “to provide clear, strong, consistent, enforceable standards
addressing discrimination against individuals with disabilities.” 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(2) (2012).
Regardless of whether a person has an actual disability as defined by the court, an employee may
sue for being discriminated against because their employer perceives them to be disabled. See id.
§ 12102(1)(C) (including “regarded as having” a disability under the definition of disability).
12. See Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 187, 200–01 (2002)
(deciding that an assembly line worker with carpal tunnel syndrome was not disabled because her
daily life activities were not impaired, only certain job-related tasks were affected); Sutton v. United
Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 481–82, 490–94 (1999) (holding that United Air Lines correctly
applied the ADA when considering whether to hire severely myopic twins who applied to be pilots,
by considering that their impairment could be mitigated through corrective lenses, but that United
did not discriminate because the vision requirement did not substantially limit the twins).
13. Sutton, 527 U.S. at 481–82.
14. Toyota Motor Mfg., 534 U.S. at 200–01.
15. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
16. 527 U.S. 471 (1999).
17. 534 U.S. 184 (2002).
18. See ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325 §§ 2(b)(2)–(4), 122 Stat. 3553
(2008) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–12103, 12111–12114, 12201, 12205–12213; 29 U.S.C. §
705 (2012)).
19. See, e.g., Francis v. City of Meridien, 129 F.3d 281, 286 (2d Cir. 1997).
20. See BNSF Ry. Co. v. Feit, 281 P.3d 225, 230 (Mont. 2012) (citing EEOC v. Res. for
Human Dev., Inc., 827 F. Supp. 2d 688, 694 (E.D. La. 2011)) (concluding that obesity itself can be
a disability).
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and well-being, lower medical claim costs, and encourage disease prevention
practices.21
Many wellness programs offer incentives in the form of reduced health
insurance premiums for employees who participate in the program or meet
certain health-related standards. 22 Though programs that merely require
participation to qualify for an incentive are not subject to federal discrimination
laws, such as the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act and the
ADA, 23 cases are starting to emerge that call into question the viability of
wellness programs and how strictly employers may regulate their employees’
health.24 For example, in Seff v. Broward County,25 the plaintiff challenged the
“voluntariness” of Broward County’s wellness initiative in the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, following a holding for the defendant in the
district court.26 In an effort to stem rising health care costs, Broward County
implemented a wellness program that aimed to incentivize employees to take
preventative health care measures and to engage in disease management.27 The
plaintiff in Seff chose not to participate in the wellness program, which required
a biometric screening and a health risk assessment, and, as a result, a twentydollar surcharge was added to his paycheck each pay period.28
The ADA prohibits employers from requiring medical examinations or
making medically-related inquiries of their employees,29 but it also provides an

21. Soeren Mattke, et al., RAND HEALTH, WORKPLACE WELLNESS PROGRAMS STUDY xiii
(2013), available at http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/pdf/workplacewellnessstudyfinal.pdf. Wellness
programs are provided by about half of all employers with fifty or more employees and usually
include a health risk assessment and clinical screenings to retrieve biometric data such as height,
weight, body mass index, and blood glucose levels. Id. at xiv, v. Wellness programs typically
consist of “screening activities to identify health risks . . . [,] preventive interventions to address
manifest health risks . . . [, and] health promotion activities to further healthy lifestyles.” Id. at 21.
22. See id. at 67.
23. Id. at 68.
24. See, e.g., Seff v. Broward Cnty., 778 F. Supp. 2d 1370, 1373–74 (S.D. Fla. 2011)
(providing a detailed review of an employee wellness program), aff’d 691 F.3d 1221 (11th Cir.
2012).
25. 691 F.3d 1221 (11th Cir. 2012).
26. Id. at 1222.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(4)(A) (2012). Under the ADA, an employer may make varying
degrees of inquiry into an employee’s disability status or medical conditions depending on if the
inquiries are pre-offer, post-offer, or during employment. Id. §§ 12112(d)(2)–(3). Prior to
employment, the ADA prohibits all medical and disability inquiries regardless of whether or not
they are related to the job. Id. §§ 12112(d)(2)(A). After an employee is offered a position, the
employer may make any inquiries into an employee’s medical history, regardless of whether or not
they are related to the job, as long as the employer treats all entering employees equally. Id. §
12112(d)(3)(A). After employment begins, an employer may make inquiries “only if they are jobrelated and consistent with business necessity.” EEOC NOTICE 915.002, ENFORCEMENT
GUIDANCE: DISABILITY-RELATED INQUIRIES AND MEDICAL EXAMINATIONS OF EMPLOYEES
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exemption from these prohibitions for voluntary wellness programs that meet
certain criteria. 30 Mr. Seff argued that the wellness program was not truly
voluntary because nonparticipation in the program resulted in a penalty. 31
However, in granting summary judgment to the defendant, the district court did
not address the voluntariness of the program because it found that the county’s
wellness program met the requirements of the ADA’s safe harbor provision.32
This Note discusses how employer-promoted wellness programs are potential
breeding grounds for discrimination claims in light of recent ADA cases relating
to obesity and how courts’ treatment of the safe harbor provision of the ADA is
incongruent with the broadening of ADA claims. It begins with an examination
of the ADA and looks at how courts have considered the definition of
“disability” in regard to obesity. In addition, it provides a description of the
ADA safe harbor provision and continues with a discussion of the development
of company wellness programs that led to Seff v. Broward County. This is
followed by an analysis of how the Seff decision, combined with the recent
treatment of obesity under the ADA and the safe harbor provision, reveals a
disconnect between the judicial system’s increasing leniency toward obese
individuals and broad allowance of organizations to potentially discriminate
against individuals under the guise of corporate wellness programs.

UNDER THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT (ADA) (2000) [hereinafter ENFORCEMENT
GUIDANCE], available at http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/guidance-inquiries.html.
30. See 42 U.S.C. § 12201(c)(2).
31. Seff v. Broward Cnty., 778 F. Supp. 2d 1370, 1373 (S.D. Fla. 2011). According to the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), a wellness program is voluntary if an
employer does not require participation and does not penalize employees for not participating.
ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE, supra note 29.
32. Seff, 778 F. Supp. 2d at 1372 n.3. See Broward County’s Motion for Summary Judgment
and Supporting Memorandum of Law, Seff v. Broward Cnty., 778 F. Supp. 2d 1370, 1373 (S.D.
Fla. 2011) (No. 10-CV-61437), 2011 WL 10795884. The safe harbor provision of the ADA
expressly allows an organization to establish, sponsor, observe, or administer “the terms of a bona
fide benefit plan that are based on underwriting risks, classifying risks, or administering such risks
that are based on or not inconsistent with State law.” 42 U.S.C. § 12201(c)(2). See Parker v. Metro.
Life Ins. Co., 121 F.3d 1006 (6th Cir. 1997). In Parker, a panel of the court decided that the safe
harbor provision of the ADA was ambiguous and looked to legislative history for guidance. Id. at
1009. The panel decided that “insurance practices are protected by the ‘safe harbor’ provision, but
only to the extent that they are consistent with ‘sound actuarial principles,’ ‘actual reasonably
anticipated experience,’ and ‘bona fide risk classification.’” Id. The safe harbor provision does
not provide protection to employers if the insurance plan or program is merely subterfuge, which
is prohibited under 42 U.S.C. § 12201(c). The court found that under the ADA an insurance plan
qualifies as a subterfuge “if it is ‘based on speculation, and not on sound actuarial principles, actual
or reasonably anticipated experience, or bona fide risk classification.’” Parker, 121 F.3d at 1000.
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I. COURTS TACKLE OBESITY DISCRIMINATION CLAIMS AND THE SAFE HARBOR
PROVISION UNDER THE ADA
A. Impairment Must Have an Underlying Physiological Cause
The ADA defines disability as “a physical or mental impairment that
substantially limits one or more major life activities.” 33 When courts began
hearing ADA cases in the early 1990s, the definition of “impairment” was
interpreted narrowly and did not encompass any condition that lacked an
underlying physiological cause.34 Courts have not defined “physiological” in
any certain terms, but instead have referred to the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission’s (EEOC) definition of impairment to determine if a
disability has an underlying physiological cause. 35 According to the EEOC,
impairment is “[a]ny physiological disorder or condition, cosmetic
disfigurement, or anatomical loss affecting one or more body systems” or “any
mental or psychological disorder.”36
For example, in Andrews v. Ohio,37 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit dismissed a discrimination claim because it did not view obesity as
having an underlying physiological cause.38 In Andrews, a group of Ohio State
Highway Patrol officers sued the State of Ohio when they failed the Highway

33. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)(a). This Note focuses on Title I of the ADA as it relates to
employment claims. See id. §§ 12111–12117. Title II relates to public entities and public
transportation. See id. §§ 12131–12165. Title III relates to public accommodations. See id. §§
12181–12189. The statute specifies that a disability is not to be “transitory and minor.” Id. §
12102(3)(b). The statute also includes a general list of major life activities that the impairment
could limit: “caring for oneself, performing manual tasks, seeing, hearing, eating, sleeping,
walking, standing, lifting, bending, speaking, breathing, learning, reading, concentrating, thinking,
communicating, and working.” Id. § 12102(2)(a); see Disability Discrimination, U.S. EQUAL EMP.
OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, http://www.eeoc.gov/laws/types/disability.cfm (last visited Sept. 24,
2014). In a 2006 case out of the Eastern District of New York, the court held:
In order to make out a prima facie case under the ADA, a plaintiff must establish (1) that
the plaintiff’s employer is subject to the ADA; (2) that the plaintiff was disabled within
the meaning of the ADA; (3) that the plaintiff was otherwise qualified to perform the
essential functions of his or her job, with or without reasonable accommodation; and (4)
that the plaintiff suffered an adverse employment action because of his or her disability.
Spiegel v. Schulmann, No. 03-CV-5088, 2006 WL 3483922, at *12 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 30, 2006).
34. See EEOC v. Watkins Motor Lines, Inc., 463 F.3d 436 (6th Cir. 2006); Francis v. City of
Meridien, 129 F.3d 281 (2d Cir. 1997); Andrews v. Ohio, 104 F.3d 803, 808 (6th Cir. 1997).
35. See Watkins Motor Lines, 463 F.3d at 443–44; Francis, 129 F.3d at 283; Andrews, 104
F.3d at 808. The Merriam-Webster Dictionary defines physiology as “a branch of biology that
deals with the functions and activities of life or of living matter (as organs, tissues, or cells) and of
the physical and chemical phenomena involved.”
MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY,
http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/physiology (last visited Feb. 23, 2015).
36. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h)(1)–(2) (2012). The EEOC is the federal agency responsible for
enforcing the ADA.
37. 104 F.3d 803 (6th Cir. 1997).
38. Id. at 810.
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Patrol Fitness Program (HPFP). 39 The HPFP established a set of physical
endurance and strength criteria for its officers that included maximum weight
limits.40 The officers argued that the weight limits were unrelated to the job and
that enforcement of the limits was discriminatory because of the perceived
failure of the officers in the eyes of their supervisors for being overweight.41
The Sixth Circuit dismissed the officers’ claims because even if the officers
did in fact face discrimination, they did not properly allege a perceived
“impairment.”42 The court held that “physical characteristics that are ‘not the
result of a physiological disorder’ are not considered ‘impairments’ for the
purposes of determining either actual or perceived disability.”43 The court stated
that a commonplace physical characteristic alone does not constitute a
physiological disorder, and, consequently, granted the state’s motion to
dismiss.44
In 1997, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit faced a similar
situation regarding an employee whose weight exceeded a weight/fitness
requirement for city firefighters.45 In Francis v. City of Meridien,46 a firefighter
did not meet the height/weight requirement and refused to complete the physical
fitness test that was required if the weight requirement was not met.47 As a
39. Id. at 805–06.
40. Id. at 805.
41. Id. at 806. It is the responsibility of the plaintiff to show a prima facie case of
discrimination. Id. at 808. The court compared the situation to Tudyman v. United Airlines, 608
F. Supp. 739 (C.D. Cal. 1984), in which a prospective flight attendant exceeded the weight-forheight limit not because he was overweight but because he had too much muscle mass. Andrews,
104 F.3d at 809. The Tudyman court did not find that there was any discrimination because the
flight attendant’s physique was voluntary and not the result of a physiological disorder. See
Tudyman, 608 F. Supp. at 746. The Andrews court held, “[b]ecause a mere physical characteristic
does not, without more, equal a physiological disorder, where an employee’s failure to meet the
employer’s job criteria is based solely on the possession of such a physical characteristic, the
employee does not sufficiently allege a cause of action.” Andrews, 104 F.3d at 810.
42. Id. at 810.
43. Id. at 808.
44. Id. To hold a mere physical characteristic as an impairment would distort the “concept of
an impairment [which] implies a characteristic that is not commonplace” and would thereby
“debase [the] high purpose [of] the statutory protections available to those truly handicapped.”
Forrisi v. Bowen, 794 F.2d 931, 934 (4th Cir. 1986) (citing Jasany v. USPS, 755 F.2d 1244, 1249
(6th Cir. 1985)). The Forrisi court stated:
The Rehabilitation Act assures that truly disabled, but genuinely capable, individuals will
not face discrimination in employment because of stereotypes about the
insurmountability of their handicaps. It would debase this high purpose if the statutory
protections available to those truly handicapped could be claimed by anyone whose
disability was minor and whose relative severity of impairment was widely shared.
Id.
45. Francis v. City of Meridien, 129 F.3d 281, 282 (2d Cir. 1997).
46. 129 F.3d 281 (2d Cir. 1997).
47. Id. at 282. Some argue that the reason courts are reluctant to consider obesity a disability
is because society believes that the obese individual is responsible for his/her weight problem. Jane
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result, the fire department suspended him. 48 The firefighter alleged that the
city’s discipline for his failure to meet the weight requirement was
discriminatory because the city perceived that he had a disability.49 The court,
as in Andrews, referred to the definition of “physical impairment” under the
ADA and quoted the EEOC regulation that stated:
It is important to distinguish between conditions that are impairments
and physical, psychological, environmental, cultural and economic
characteristics that are not impairments. The definition of the term
“impairment” does not include physical characteristics such as eye
color, hair color, left-handedness, or height, weight or muscle tone that
are within “normal” range and are not the result of a physiological
disorder.50
The Court of Appeals affirmed the district court’s dismissal.51 The employee’s
weight was not considered an impairment under the ADA due to the lack of an
underlying physiological cause and because the employer did not perceive the
employee as suffering from a physiologically-caused condition.52
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit’s decision in EEOC v. Watkins
Motor Lines, Inc. 53 was similar to the Second Circuit’s holding in Francis but
also signaled a slight shift in the court’s interpretation. 54 In Watkins Motor
Lines, a driver/dockworker filed a claim alleging discrimination after he was
terminated due to his morbid obesity.55 The court held that morbid obesity may
be considered an ADA impairment if accompanied by an underlying
physiological cause, but it refused to acknowledge the EEOC’s argument that
morbid obesity is more than a commonplace, normal physical characteristic.56
Korn, Too Fat, 17 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 209, 211 (2010). The social stigma of being overweight,
and the belief that a person’s weight is voluntary, hampers the courts’ ability to consider obesity as
a disability. Id. There are differing opinions on the degree of voluntariness involved in obesity,
but the problem facing courts often lies in the fact that the cause of any certain individual’s obesity
is a mixture of multiple factors and often difficult to determine. Id. at 224.
48. Francis, 129 F.3d at 282.
49. Id. at 282–83.
50. Id. (alterations in original) (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h) (2012)).
51. Id. at 287.
52. Id.
53. 463 F.3d 436 (6th Cir. 2006).
54. Id.
55. Id. at 438–39.
56. Id. at 444–45; see also 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h)(1) (2012) (defining “physical impairment”
as requiring some physiological disorder). The court in Watkins Motor Lines stated:
The plaintiffs’ conditions were far from constituting an ADA impairment as, not only
were the plaintiffs’ conditions not physiologically caused, but they were not even
abnormally obese. To interpret the above sentence any other way would suggest that we
held that any physical abnormality—for example, someone extremely tall or grossly
short—may be ADA impairment. We decline to extend ADA protection to all
“abnormal” (whatever that term may mean) physical characteristics.
Watkins Motor Lines, 463 F.3d at 442–43.
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As a result, the court concluded that the EEOC did not meet its burden of proving
the existence of an impairment under the ADA.57 Both Francis and Watkins
Motor Lines emphasize the requirement of an underlying physiological cause in
order for a disability to be covered under the ADA and demonstrate courts’ very
narrow interpretation of discriminatory practices.58
B. The Expansion of Physical and Mental Impairments
Andrews, Francis, and Watkins Motor Lines were decided prior to the
Americans with Disabilities Act Amendments of 2008 (ADAA). 59 Cases
decided after the passage of the 2008 Amendments reached very different
conclusions regarding the need for an underlying physiological cause to qualify
as having a disability.60 By eliminating the courts’ use of mitigating factors in
evaluating disabilities and lifting strict limits on what constitutes the substantial
impairment of a life activity, the ADAA broadened the definition of disability
to cover impairments previously excluded from discriminatory claims.61
In the 2013 case Anderson v. Macy’s, Inc.,62 a patron of Macy’s stores alleged
discrimination under Title III of the ADA. The discrimination claim was based
on the fact that Macy’s had priced plus-size items higher than smaller sizes,
placed plus-size clothing in hidden parts of the store, and made plus-size

57. Id. at 445.
58. See id.; Francis v. City of Meridien, 129 F.3d 281, 287 (2d Cir. 1997); see also Andrews
v. Ohio, 104 F.3d 803, 810 (6th Cir. 1997) (relying on the federal definition of impairment when
finding law enforcement officers’ weight was not an impairment because it was not the result of an
underlying physiological condition).
59. See Watkins Motor Lines, 463 F.3d at 436 (decided in 2006); Francis, 129 F.3d at 281
(decided in 1997); Andrews, 104 F.3d at 803 (decided in 1997); see also ADA Amendments Act of
2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, 122 Stat. 3553 (2008) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–12103, 12111–
12114, 12201, 12205–12213; 29 U.S.C. § 705 (2012)) (demonstrating that the Amendments were
enacted in 2008, following the previous cases).
60. Compare Francis, 129 F.3 at 287 (finding that when a firefighter was disciplined for
exceeding weight requirements, his weight was not a disability under the ADA because it lacked
an underlying cause), and Andrews, 104 F.3d at 810 (holding that law enforcement officers’ weight
was not an impairment under the ADA because there was no underlying physiological condition),
with BNSF Ry. Co. v. Feit, 281 P.3d 225, 231 (Mont. 2012) (finding that obesity without an
underlying physiological cause could be considered a physical impairment if the weight is outside
the normal range), and EEOC v. Res. of Human Dev., Inc., 827 F. Supp. 2d 688, 695 (E.D. La.
2011) (deciding that obesity is considered a disability under the ADA, even if there is no underlying
cause).
61. Amendments Act § 4(a), § 2(a)(4)–(7) (explaining that Congress did not intend for the
Supreme Court to narrow the definition of individuals with disabilities, and “as a result of these
Supreme Court cases, lower courts have incorrectly found in individual cases that people with a
range of substantially limiting impairments are not people with disabilities.”). The Amendments
Act of 2008 overturned the Supreme Court’s holdings in Sutton v. United Air Lines and Toyota
Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc. v. Williams. See id. § 2(b).
62. 943 F. Supp. 2d 531 (W.D. Pa. 2013).
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clothing aisles narrower than other aisles. 63 The U.S. District Court for the
Western District of Pennsylvania dismissed the patron’s complaints regarding
pricing and location within the store, but recognized that narrow aisles may be a
valid ADA claim because they were not wide enough to accommodate her.64
Though the court acknowledged one of the plaintiff’s alleged obesity claims, the
Anderson case did not go as far as explicitly categorizing obesity as a disability
under the ADAA.65 In 2009, an applicant to the Burlington Northern Santa Fe
Railway Company (BNSF) filed a complaint with the Montana Department of
Labor and Industry alleging that BNSF refused to hire him because of his
obesity.66 Following the department’s ruling in favor of the applicant, BNSF
filed an appeal with the Montana Human Rights Commission, who confirmed
the department’s decision. 67 BNSF then petitioned the district court, which
certified the question to the Montana Supreme Court to address whether obesity
could be categorized as a “physical or mental impairment.”68
The Montana Supreme Court recognized that the ADAA intended “a broad
scope of protection to be available” and “the definition of disability . . . shall be
construed in favor of broad coverage.” 69 The court considered the EEOC
63. Id. at 535–36; see id. at 543–45 (explaining that although no other district court had
recognized obesity as a disability under the ADA, in light of the 2008 Amendments, the court was
unwilling to definitively exclude obesity as a disability); see also 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a) (2012)
(stating that under Title III of the ADA, which covers public accommodations and commercial
facilities, individuals with disabilities must not be denied equal opportunities to enjoy commercial
goods and services offered).
64. Anderson, 943 F. Supp. 2d at 547–50 (dismissing the entire claim without prejudice to
give the plaintiff the opportunity to file an amended complaint better articulating the claim
regarding the aisle width).
65. Compare id. at 548–50 (dismissing multiple claims made by an obese plaintiff regarding
the price and location of plus-sized clothing at Macy’s, but acknowledging that she may have an
ADA claim regarding the narrow aisles in which the plus-sized clothes were located), with Feit,
281 P.3d at 231 (finding that obesity without an underlying physiological cause could be considered
a disability when plaintiff alleged he was not hired due to his weight).
66. Id. at 227.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 227–28. BNSF told the conductor trainee applicant that he was not qualified
“because of the ‘significant health and safety risks associated with extreme obesity.’” Id. at 227.
In addition, BNSF told the individual that he needed to lose ten percent of his body weight or
complete physical exams in order to be considered. Id.
69. Id. at 228 (omission in original) (quoting ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No.
110-325, § 2, § 4, 122 Stat. 3553, 3554–55 (2008)). The EEOC noted, prior to the Amendments of
2008, that being overweight was generally not an impairment but that “severe obesity, which has
been defined as body weight more than 100% over the norm is clearly an impairment.” EEOC
COMPLIANCE MANUAL § 902.2(C)(5)(ii) (2011) (internal citations omitted), available at
http://www/eeoc.gov/policy/docs/902cm.html (noting pre-2000 precedent). This section of the
compliance manual was removed from the EEOC website on July 25, 2012, because it was
superseded by the Amendments Act of 2008. David M. Katz, Obesity as a Covered Disability
Under the ADA, DAILY LABOR REPORT, BLOOMBERG BUREAU OF NAT’L AFF., INC., Oct. 5, 2012,
at 2, available at http://www.employmentmattersblog.com/files/2014/05/obesity-as-a-covereddisability-under-the-ADA-oct.-5-2012.pdf.
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Compliance Manual’s statement that “[t]he mere presence of an impairment
does not automatically mean that an individual has a disability. Whether severe
obesity rises to the level of a disability will turn on whether the obesity
substantially limits, has substantially limited, or is regarded as substantially
limiting, a major life activity.” 70 In light of the ADAA and the EEOC
guidelines, the court sided with the job applicant, holding that his obesity
qualified as a disability because his weight was outside a normal range and
affected one or more body systems.71
Applying a similar analysis, EEOC v. Resources for Human Development,
Inc.72 recognized severe obesity as a disability.73 The plaintiff was hired as a
specialist at a long-term residential treatment facility for drug-dependent women
in 1999 and was subsequently terminated eight years later.74 She was severely
obese throughout her tenure as an employee and had multiple conditions as a
result of her obesity, such as diabetes, congestive heart failure, and
hypertension.75 The EEOC argued, and the court recognized, that neither the
EEOC nor any other court “[has] ever required a disabled party to prove the
underlying basis of [his] impairment” and “[t]he cause of a condition has no
effect on whether that condition is an impairment.”76 The U.S. District Court
for the Eastern District of Louisiana held that summary judgment for the
employer was inappropriate because there was a genuine issue of material fact
as to how the employer perceived the plaintiff and her ability to perform her
essential job functions. 77 The cases disregarding the need for an underlying
physiological impairment and recognizing obesity as a legitimate disability
signal a shift in the way courts are interpreting the ADA, and reveal the possible
expansion of discrimination claims.78

70. Feit, 281 P.3d at 230 (alteration in original) (quoting EEOC COMPLIANCE MANUAL §
902.2(c)(5)(ii) n.16).
71. Id. at 231; see also MT Joins Obesity Debate: No Underlying Condition Necessary to
Prove a Disability, 23 ADA COMPLIANCE GUIDE NEWSL., no. 9 , Sept. 2012, at 7.
72. 827 F. Supp. 2d 688 (E.D. La. 2011).
73. Id. at 695.
74. Id. at 690. The plaintiff weighed 527 pounds at the time of her termination and
subsequently filed a charge of discrimination with the EEOC. Id. at 690. She passed away shortly
thereafter, and the EEOC filed the lawsuit on behalf of her estate. Id. at 691.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 694 (quoting EEOC COMPLIANCE MANUAL § 902.2(e) (2011) (internal citations
omitted), available at http://www/eeoc.gov/policy/docs/902cm.html). In the case, the plaintiff
stated “[t]o require establishment of the underlying cause of the impairment in a morbid obesity
[case], but not in any other disability cases, would epitomize the very prejudices and stereotypes
which the ADA was passed to address.” Id. (alteration in original).
77. Id. at 700.
78. See generally supra notes 71–77 and accompanying text. Cf. Andrews v. Ohio, 104 F.3d
803, 810 (6th Cir. 1997) (holding that obesity did not qualify as a legitimate disability because there
was no physiological impairment).
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C. The Safe Harbor Provision and the ADA
The safe harbor provision of the ADA, as enacted in 1990, provides an
exemption for employers to avoid discrimination claims by employees.79 Under
the safe harbor provision, bona fide benefit plans are not subject to state laws
regulating insurance, or to ADA claims, unless there is proof of subterfuge and
an intent to evade the statute. 80 In 2008, “Congress created an exception to
enable organizations to sponsor or provide bona fide benefit plans not subject to
state insurance laws even if they offer different terms to disabled individuals.”81
There have been numerous cases in which discriminatory benefits practices by
an employer would have been subject to the ADA, yet the safe harbor provision
shielded the employer from claims by employees.82
Courts have treated the safe harbor provision similarly both before and after
the ADA Amendments Act of 2008.83 In a notable case from 2000, EEOC v.
Aramark Corp., 84 a food service manager worked at Aramark for ten years
before a mental illness forced her to leave.85 She received long-term disability
payments through the company’s insurance carrier following her termination.86
However, the long-term disability insurance plan provided only twenty-four
months of coverage for mental disabilities, but would have continued payments
until age sixty-five had the disability been physical.87 The employee argued that
the plan’s differing benefit terms for mental and physical disabilities constituted
discrimination under the ADA.88 The court rejected the EEOC’s argument and

79. See 42 U.S.C. § 12201(c)(3) (2012) (noting an exception regarding benefit plans); see
also Grant P. H. Shuman, Escaping the Purpose of the ADA: The “Safe Harbor” Provision and
Disability-Based Distinctions in Insurance Policies and Programs, 36 GONZ. L. REV. 549, 556–58
(2000–01) (recognizing a conflict between the aims of the ADA and legitimate insurance needs).
80. See 42 U.S.C. § 12201(c)(3).
81. Rouse v. Berry, 848 F. Supp. 2d 4, 7 (D.D.C. 2012) (holding that the employer’s
curtailment of long-term care benefits for a disabled employee was not “subterfuge” to evade the
ADA). A bona fide benefit plan is defined as a plan that “exists and pays benefits.” Id. (quoting
Pub. Emps. Ret. Sys. of Ohio v. Betts, 492 U.S. 158, 166 (1989)). Courts have interpreted
subterfuge to mean “a scheme, plan, stratagem, or artifice of evasion.” Modderno v. King, 82 F.3d
1059, 1064 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (quoting Betts, 492 U.S. at 167). Proof of subterfuge must be relatively
overt and requires a showing of discriminatory intent and not just a lack of actuarial justification.
EEOC v. Aramark Corp., Inc., 208 F.3d 266, 271 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
82. See, e.g., id. at 271–73; Rouse, 848 F. Supp. 2d at 12–13.
83. See generally infra notes 84–96 and accompanying text (comparing a court’s holding in
2008 on the safe harbor provision of the ADA with a post-2008 holding following the enactment
of the ADA Amendments).
84. 208 F.3d 266 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
85. Id. at 267.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id. The EEOC argued that the twenty-four month limit on benefits for a mental disability
violated ADA §§ 12111–17, which prohibit an employer from discriminating “against a qualified
individual with a disability because of the disability of such individual in regard to [the] terms,
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found that Aramark’s long-term disability insurance fell under the safe harbor
provision of the ADA as a bona fide benefits plan.89 The court asserted that the
benefits fell under the safe harbor provision not only because Aramark’s plan
was adopted before the ADA,90 but also because “subterfuge to evade” does not
mean there is solely a lack of actuarial data to support the existence of the
benefits plan; there must be a more substantial claim of discrimination made by
the plaintiff.91 The decision allowed for an employee with a mental illness to be
treated differently than other employees and to be discriminated against only
because her employer’s insurance fell under the safe harbor provision.92
Similarly, in the post-2008 case Rouse v. Berry,93 a paraplegic government
employee filed a complaint against the Office of Personnel Management (OPM)
when he was denied long-term care insurance due to his use of a wheelchair.94
OPM justified its policy by relying on industry experience and underwriting
reports from the insurance carriers about the level of risk involved in the plan
for the employer.95 The court determined that, as in Aramark, there must be
overt evidence of subterfuge in order to exempt the benefit plan from the safe
harbor provision.96 These cases provide wide latitude to employers to establish
benefit plans that are discriminatory by arguing that treatment of the safe harbor
provision by the courts has not changed since the ADAA. 97 The advent of
wellness programs has opened the door for potentially discriminatory use of the
safe harbor provision, as demonstrated by Seff v. Broward County.98

conditions, and privileges of employment.” Id. (alteration in original) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a)
(2012)).
89. See id. at 268.
90. Id. at 269.
91. Id. at 271. The court cited Ford v. Schering-Plough Corp., 145 F.3d 601 (3d Cir. 1998),
which stated, “[w]e will not construe section 501(c) to require a seismic shift in the insurance
business, namely requiring insurers to justify their coverage plans in court after a mere allegation
by a plaintiff.” Aramark, 208 F.3d at 271 (quoting Ford, 145 F.3d at 612).
92. See Aramark, 208 F.3d at 267–68 (discussing the differences between insurance
coverage).
93. 848 F. Supp. 2d 4 (D.D.C. 2012).
94. Id. at 5.
95. See id. at 6–7. This use of actuarial data is consistent with the requirements outlined in
the safe harbor provision of the ADA. See 42 U.S.C. § 12201(c) (2012).
96. Rouse, 848 F. Supp. 2d at 13; see Modderno v. King, 82 F.3d 1059, 1064–65 (D.C. Cir.
1996) (providing a detailed discussion of subterfuge).
97. See Aramark, 208 F.3d at 267; Rouse, 848 F. Supp. 2d at 12.
98. See Seff v. Broward Cnty., 691 F.3d 1221, 1224 (11th Cir. 2012).
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II. SEFF V. BROWARD COUNTY: SETTING THE STAGE FOR ADA OBESITY
CLAIMS
The ADA Amendments of 2008 were successful in persuading courts to
broaden the scope of coverage for obese individuals. 99 The Amendments
coincided with a rise in employer wellness programs in the workplace and
employers’ goal of improving the health of their employees, including reducing
their weight. 100 Employers have adopted wellness programs to encourage
disease prevention and, ultimately, to lower medical insurance costs and
improve productivity.101 Wellness programs utilize a variety of incentives to
motivate employees to participate, such as reduced health insurance premium
payments with no penalties for non-participation.102
Employers must be careful not to run afoul of several federal regulations when
offering incentives or imposing penalties.103 The nondiscrimination provisions
of the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) make it
illegal to deny eligibility for benefits or to charge more for group health coverage
based on a health factor, although certain exceptions allow wellness programs
to offer incentives when particular requirements are met. 104 HIPAA will
generally not apply if a wellness program is structured so that conditions for
obtaining an incentive are not based on an employee meeting a certain health
standard, participation in the program is voluntary, and the plan is made
available to all similarly-situated individuals.105
99. See ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, §§ 2–4, 122 Stat. 3553–56
(2008); Anderson v. Macy’s, Inc., 943 F. Supp. 2d 531, 543–45 (W.D. Pa. 2013); BNSF Ry. Co.
v. Feit, 281 P.3d 225, 231 (Mont. 2012); see also Lowe v. Am. Eurocopter, LLC, No. 1:10CV24A-D, 2010 WL 5232523, at *8 (N.D. Miss. Dec. 16, 2010) (holding that a plaintiff whose obesity
caused her inability to walk from the regular company parking lot may be able to prove she was
terminated due to her impairment). In Lowe, despite the defendant’s assertion that “obesity is not
a disabling impairment,” “the Court is unable to say that obesity can never be a disability under the
ADA, especially given that on September 25, 2008, the ADA was amended by the Americans with
Disabilities Act Amendments Act of 2008.” Id. at *6.
100. See Mattke, supra note 21, at 1–3.
101. See id. at 3. The RAND study found that results-based incentives in wellness programs
are usually administered through the employer rather than the employer’s health plan. See id. at
xxi. Researchers caution that long-term studies are necessary to demonstrate the cost-benefits of
wellness programs. See id. at 3 (noting that those programs are relatively new). A recent review
found that the return on investment is 3:1 for direct medical cost and absenteeism, but stated that
these results may not be typical. Id.; see also Katerine Baicker, et al., Workplace Wellness
Programs Can Generate Savings, 29:2 HEALTH AFFS. (2010) (discussing the benefits of wellness
programs).
102. Mattke, supra note 21, at xxi. Employers most often reported using incentives rather than
penalties in the administration of wellness programs. For example, common incentives may come
in the form of cash or health insurance premium surcharges, gym discounts, and novelty items such
as t-shirts. Id.
103. See id. at 66 (providing the basic provisions that govern incentive programs).
104. Id. at 66–67.
105. Id. at 67. The Affordable Care Act incorporates the HIPAA nondiscrimination rules but
permits the value of wellness program incentives up to thirty percent of the cost of coverage in
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Similarly, the ADA prohibits employers from penalizing, or having a reward
withheld from, individuals with health conditions that qualify as a disability.106
Seff v. Broward County is the first federal case that addressed employer wellness
programs and the limits that employers may set to incentivize and penalize their
employees for engaging in a wellness program.107 A public employee brought
a class action suit against Broward County, Florida, alleging that the
government’s wellness program violated the ADA.108 The employee claimed
that the employer violated the ADA by requiring that employees undergo a
medical examination and disclose certain medical conditions as part of a
voluntary wellness program.109
Employees who fit into any of five disease categories identified by the
employer were encouraged to participate in a disease management coaching
program. 110 Though participation in the county’s wellness program was not
required to enroll in the group health plan, in 2010, the county attempted to
encourage more participation by levying a twenty-dollar surcharge on each

2014 as opposed to HIPAA’s twenty percent. Id. The statute also gives discretion to federal
department secretaries to increase the reward to up to fifty percent of the cost of coverage. Id. A
wellness program may not be discriminatory under HIPAA if it meets HIPAA’s requirements, but
the same program may be discriminatory under the ADA. HIPAA outlines five requirements for
wellness programs:
(1) The total reward for all the plan’s wellness programs that require satisfaction of a
standard related to a health factor must not exceed 20 percent of the cost of employeeonly coverage under the plan. If dependents (such as spouses and/or dependent children)
may participate in the wellness program, the reward must not exceed 20 percent of the
cost of the coverage in which an employee and any dependents are enrolled.
(2) The program must be reasonably designed to promote health and prevent disease.
(3) The program must give individuals eligible to participate the opportunity to qualify
for the reward at least once per year.
(4) The reward must be available to all similarly situated individuals . . . . The program
must allow a reasonable alternative standard (or waiver of the initial standard) for
obtaining the reward to any individual for whom it is unreasonably difficult because of a
medical condition, or medically inadvisable, to satisfy the initial standard.
(5) The plan must disclose in all materials describing the terms of the program and the
availability of a reasonable alternative standard (or the possibility of a waiver of the initial
standard).
Id.
106. Id. at 68.
107. Seff v. Broward Cnty., 691 F.3d 1221, 1222–23 (11th Cir. 2012).
108. Id. at 1222.
109. Id. Broward County offered its employees a group health insurance plan and, in 2009,
began enrolling employees in its wellness program sponsored by the health insurer, Coventry
Healthcare. Id. Participation in the wellness program required a biometric screening and an online
heath-risk assessment questionnaire, and Coventry used the results to identify employees who fit
into categories of “five disease states: asthma, hypertension, diabetes, congestive heart failure, or
kidney disease.” Id. A biometric screening consisted of a finger prick to draw blood and measure
glucose and cholesterol. Id.
110. Id. at 1222.
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paycheck of employees who did not enroll.111 The plaintiff filed a class action
suit alleging that the biometric screening and health risk assessment violated the
ADA’s prohibition on “non-voluntary medical examinations and disabilityrelated inquiries.”112 The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the lower court’s grant of
summary judgment, finding that the county’s wellness program constituted a
“term” of the group health insurance plan and therefore fell within the safe
harbor provision of the ADA.113 The court ruled that the ADA did not apply to
the group health insurance plan, but did not reach the question of whether the
twenty-dollar charge for failure to participate in the wellness program made the
program involuntary, and, therefore, in violation of the ADA.114
The plaintiff’s amended motion for class action certification and incorporated
memorandum of law began with the premise that Broward County’s “voluntary”
wellness program was, in reality, not truly voluntary.115 Mr. Seff alleged that
the county’s required participation in a biometric screening and health risk
assessment was in violation of ADA § 12112 because of the required disclosure
of personal medical information. 116 He argued that because he was charged
twenty dollars per paycheck for not participating in the allegedly “voluntary”

111. Id. The plaintiff incurred the twenty-dollar charge on his paychecks for a period of
roughly six months. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 1224. The ADA contains a safe harbor provision that says the ADA “‘shall not be
construed’ as prohibiting a covered entity ‘from establishing, sponsoring, observing or
administering the terms of a bona fide benefit plan that are based on underwriting risks, classifying
risks, or administering such risks that are based on or not inconsistent with State law.’” Id. at 1223
(quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12201(c)(2) (2012)). The ADA provides a safe harbor provision that protects
a defendant from discrimination claims if the difference in treatment of employees is justified by
sound actuarial principles. Id. These disability-based distinctions may be made if the health plan
meets the requirements of a bona fide benefit plan even if the disparate treatment has an adverse
effect on disabled employees. Id. In addition, “[t]he ADA permits an employer to establish,
sponsor, observe or administer the terms of a bona fide benefit plan that are based on underwriting,
classifying, or administering such risks.” ADA Exception for Certain Health Insurance Plans, 6
EMP. COORD. EMPLOYMENT PRACTICES § 46:9, 1 (2013). It is up to the plaintiff to prove
subterfuge, or knowing evasion by the defendant of ADA requirements. See id. at 2. “The
subterfuge exception to the safe harbor provision requires that a plaintiff show that the employer
specifically intended to discriminate based on a disability, whether the discrimination was aimed
at fringe-benefit or non-fringe-benefit aspects of the employment relationship.” Id.
114. Seff, 691 F.3d at 1224.
115. Plaintiff’s Amended Motion for Class Action Certification & Incorporated Memorandum
of Law at 2, Seff v. Broward Cnty., 778 F. Supp. 2d 1370 (S.D. Fla. 2011), ECF No. 17.
116. See id. at 4 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12112 (2012)). Section 12112 prohibits an employer from
inquiring about medical information and does not allow an employer to require employees to
complete medical exams unless the inquiries and exam are job-related and necessary for the
particular position of the employee, or the medical examinations are “part of an employee health
program” and are voluntary. § 12112(d)(4)(A)–(B); see 29 C.F.R. § 1630.13(b) (2013); see
generally ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE, supra note 29 (providing explanations of what constitutes
“medical examination” and “job-related”).

2015]

Classifying Obesity as a Disability Under the ADA

555

wellness program, the program was not voluntary by definition. 117 Broward
County opposed the plaintiff’s claim that he was discriminated against under the
ADA, arguing that the twenty-dollar surcharge was needed to encourage
employees to make healthy choices and to reduce the county’s health care
costs.118 Though relying primarily on the safe harbor provision of the ADA to
rebut the contention that § 12112, the clause that prohibits medical examinations
and medical inquiries, was violated, 119 the county also contested the alleged
involuntariness of the program. 120 Broward County noted that the EEOC’s
administrative guidance is not binding on the court and that the EEOC itself has
issued conflicting opinions on what “voluntary” really means.121 The EEOC
urged the court to hold that “incentive-based wellness programs which do not
exceed HIP[A]A’s 20% financial threshold are ‘voluntary’ and permissible
under the ADA.”122
The district court in Seff, while avoiding the issue of voluntariness in its
decision to find for Broward County, relied on an expansive interpretation of the
ADA’s safe harbor provision to validate the employer’s use of a twenty-dollar
penalty for nonparticipation. 123 The district court, in granting summary
117. See Plaintiff’s Amended Motion for Class Action Certification & Incorporated
Memorandum of Law, supra note 115, at 4. The EEOC has defined a “voluntary” wellness program
as one where an employer does not require participation and does not penalize employees for not
participating. ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE, supra note 29, at Q. 22.
118. Broward County’s Motion for Summary Judgment & Supporting Memorandum of Law
at 1–2, Seff v. Broward Cnty., 778 F. Supp. 2d 1370 (S.D. Fla. 2011), ECF No. 35. The county
implemented the program to increase early disease detection and improve risk mitigation after
receiving counseling from a healthcare consultant about stemming rising healthcare costs. Id. at 3.
Broward County argued that the wellness program “properly accommodates the need of the County
to provide adequate financial incentives to encourage successful program participation while
ensuring that such financial incentives do not become unduly coercive.” Id. at 2. Broward County
implemented the wellness program in an effort to stem rising health care costs associated with the
county’s “older, sicker” workforce. See id. at 2–3.
119. See id. at 1, 8–12; 42 U.S.C. § 12201(c)(2) (2012) (“This Act shall not be construed to
prohibit or restrict . . . [covered entities] from establishing, sponsoring, observing or administering
the terms of a bona fide benefit plan that are based on underwriting risks, classifying risks, or
administering such risks that are based on or not inconsistent with State law.”).
120. Broward County’s Motion for Summary Judgment & Supporting Memorandum of Law,
supra note 118, at 12.
121. See id. at 13–14 (citing several EEOC opinions from 2004). In early 2009, the EEOC
stated that wellness programs with a financial fringe not exceeding twenty percent of the cost of
health care coverage are considered voluntary; however, the EEOC later rescinded this statement
and stated that it is continuing to examine the scope of voluntariness under the ADA. Id.
122. Id. at 15.
123. See Seff v. Broward Cnty., 778 F. Supp. 2d 1370, 1373–75 (S.D. Fla. 2011), aff’d, 691
F.3d 1221 (11th Cir. 2012). The ADA lays out four elements of the insurance safe harbor provision
that must be met for employers to legally make medical inquiries: the wellness program must be a
term of a bona fide benefit plan; the purpose of the program must be “based on underwriting risks,
classifying risks, or administering such risks”; the program must not be inconsistent with state law;
and the wellness program must not be used as a “subterfuge” to evade the ADA. Broward County’s
Motion for Summary Judgment & Supporting Memorandum of Law, supra note 118, at 9. The
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judgment to Broward County, went through each element of the safe harbor
provision to determine that the county’s wellness program met the exemption
requirements to override § 12112 of the ADA.124 The most contested element,
and the one on which Mr. Seff focused his appeal, was the requirement that the
wellness program be a “term” of a bona fide benefit plan.125 The court reasoned
that the program was a term of the health plan because the employer’s insurer,
Coventry, paid for and administered the program and the only people eligible to
participate were those individuals enrolled in the county’s health plan.126 The
plaintiff argued that the program was not a term of the health plan because an
employee could have enrolled in the health plan without participating in the
wellness program.127 In addition, the wellness program offered its own benefits,
such as disease coaching and medication cost waivers, which were independent
from the health plan. 128 These distinctions were tenuous at best. The Seff
decision is the first significant case to be litigated over the intersection of
wellness programs and the ADA. 129 The case leaves many questions
unanswered regarding the definition of “voluntary” and how employers must
structure their programs to fall within the ADA’s safe harbor provision.
III. SEFF’S BROAD ENCOMPASSMENT OF THE ADA’S SAFE HARBOR PROVISION
AND UNRESOLVED ISSUE OF VOLUNTARINESS LEAVE THE DOOR OPEN FOR
OBESITY CLAIMS
A. The Broad Interpretation of the Safe Harbor Provision is in Discord with
Recent ADA Obesity Litigation
The Seff court’s decision to ignore the issue of a wellness program’s potential
violation of the ADA makes it difficult for employees to challenge wellness
program requirements. 130 Through the ADA’s safe harbor provision, the
decision paints a broad stroke of coverage for almost all types of wellness

county argued that the wellness program was implemented to assess the risks of insuring their
employees and to help the county better administer its benefit plan. Id. at 12. It also argued that
participation in the wellness program was not a condition to enroll in the group health plan, which,
if it was, would be a clear penalty and preclude the program from being categorized as voluntary.
Id. The court in Seff agreed. See Seff, 778 F. Supp. 2d at 1373–75.
124. See id.
125. See id. at 1373 (noting that the plaintiff’s memorandum focused primarily on this issue).
126. Id. at 1372–73.
127. Id. at 1373.
128. Id. at 1372. The court cited the inclusion of wellness program language in the county’s
benefits plan handout as demonstrating that the program was a term of the group health plan. Id.
at 1373.
129. See Heather Baird, Note, Healthy Compromise: Reconciling Wellness Program Financial
Incentives with Health Reform, 97 MINN. L. REV. 1474, 1487 (2013).
130. See Seff, 778 F. Supp. 2d at 1374–75.
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programs, especially for those supposedly categorized as “voluntary.”131 The
Seff case brings to light the practical application of the ADA to company
wellness programs, and highlights two major issues: the breadth of the safe
harbor provision and the stringency and standard by which wellness programs
are deemed to be voluntary.132 Following the ADA Amendments of 2008, an
increasing number of courts recognized obesity as a legitimate disability,
regardless of the existence of an underlying physiological cause. 133 This
expansion of coverage for previously excluded conditions—particularly obesity,
which continues to rise in the United States 134 —is in contrast with the Seff
court’s disregard for ADA prohibitions when a wellness program meets the
criteria to fit within the ADA’s safe harbor provision.135
The Seff court addressed the five factors necessary to exempt the county’s
wellness program from ADA prohibitions on medical exams and inquiries, but
did not analyze the factors in depth, leaving room for argument regarding what
kind of wellness programs are actually exempted from ADA regulations.136 The
first requirement is that the wellness program be a term of a bona fide health
benefit plan.137 The court explained that Broward County’s wellness program
was a term of the health plan because it was mentioned in a health plan
document, the insurer sponsored the program, and the program was only
available to health plan participants.138 According to the court, the mere mention
of a wellness program in a health plan document results in the program
automatically being considered a term of the health plan, making it seemingly
easy for an employer to prove that a wellness program is a bona fide term.139
Another prong, consistency with state law, was interpreted by the Seff court
in favor of Broward County because Florida law authorized employers to offer

131. See John L. Utz, Wellness and the ADA, 20 no. 4 ERISA LITIG. REP. (NEWSL.) 1, 5–6
(2012).
132. Seff, 778 F. Supp. 2d at 1373–74.
133. See EEOC v. Res. for Human Dev., Inc., 827 F. Supp. 2d 688, 694 (E.D. La. 2011); BNSF
Ry. Co. v. Feit, 281 P.3d 225, 231 (Mont. 2012).
134. CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, supra note 1.
135. See Utz, supra note 131, at 4–5 (discussing Seff).
136. See id. at 4–6; Seff, 778 F. Supp. 2d at 1373–75.
137. See 42 U.S.C. § 12201(c)(2) (2012).
138. Seff, 778 F. Supp. 2d at 1373.
139. See id. There is no precedent about what constitutes a term of a bona fide health plan in
reference to wellness programs:
The court did not, it appears, look directly at the terms of the health plan document to
determine whether the wellness program was a term of the health plan. In fact, it appears
the health plan document was not even included in the record before the court. But the
court identified three facts as being sufficient in the aggregate to establish that the
wellness program was a term of a bona fide benefit plan (the health plan), so as to enjoy
the ADA exemption.
Utz, supra note 131, at 4.
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discounts on insurance in return for meeting health promotion requirements.140
Although the plaintiff argued that the discount to participating employees was
in fact also a penalty for non-participating employees, the court dismissed that
argument and did not analyze the state law in depth. 141 Concerning the
exemption requirement that a wellness program be “based on underwriting risks,
classifying risks, or administering such risks,” 142 the Seff court relied on the
county’s assertion that the wellness program was implemented after discussions
with a health consultant.143 The health consultant provided research showing
that wellness programs lower insurance premiums and that the county could use
the aggregate health data collected in the biometric screenings and health risk
assessments to shape future health plans. 144 Though there is little research
regarding the financial connection between wellness programs and lower health
insurance costs for employers, 145 the court seemed willing to take the
assumption at face-value that the county would use the wellness program data
to underwrite and classify risks.146 In addition, the court did not find evidence
of subterfuge, as was necessary to dismiss earlier safe harbor provision cases,147
but instead made a blanket statement about the importance of the program to
employees, whether they were disabled or not.148
140. See Utz, supra note 131, at 4; see also Seff, 778 F. Supp. 2d at 1375 (noting no contrary
Florida law).
141. See Seff, 778 F. Supp. 2d at 1373–75; Utz, supra note 131, at 4.
142. 42 U.S.C. § 12201(c)(2) (2012).
143. See Seff, 778 F. Supp. 2d at 1371, 1373–74.
144. Id. at 1371–72, 1374; Utz, supra note 131, at 5.
145. See Mattke, supra note 21, at xxvi, 53, 107.
146. Utz, supra note 131, at 5. Broward County cited a decision in the Third Circuit, Ford v.
Schering-Plough Corp., 145 F.3d 601 (3d Cir. 1998), to support its stance that their wellness
program need not be justified by actuarial data. Utz, supra note 131, at 5; Ford, 145 F.3d at 611–
12. However, the EEOC’s 1993 interim guidance suggests that this data should be considered. See
EEOC NOTICE, NO. 915.002, §§ III(C), V(1) (June 8, 1993), available at http://www.eeoc.gov/
policy/docs/health.html. For a discussion on the safe harbor provision and its interplay with the
insurance industry, see Shuman, supra note 79, at 558–59. Shuman discussed the legislative history
of the safe harbor provision and the tension between affording rights to disabled individuals and
bowing to the insurance industry:
[T]he statute appears to be purposefully vague in order to satisfy contending interest
groups. Unable to decide on exactly what it intended to legislate, Congress inserted
language which looks in two directions. One provision attempts to appease the insurance
industry; the other provisions attempt to help the large group of disabled people.
Id. at 556 (quoting Parker v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 99 F.3d 181, 190 (6th Cir. 1996), vacated, 107
F.3d 359 (1997)). See also Rachel Schneller Ziegler, Safe, But Not Sound: Limiting Safe Harbor
Immunity for Health and Disability Insurers and Self-Insured Employers Under the Americans with
Disabilities Act, 101 MICH. L. REV. 840 (2002).
147. See supra Part I.C.
148. See Seff, 778 F. Supp. 2d at 1375 (claiming that the program is “enormously beneficial”
but not detailing how); Nina G. Stillman & Andy R. Anderson, Wellness Program Falls Within
ADA Safe Harbor, MORGAN LEWIS (Sept. 18, 2012) https://www.morganlewis.com/
index.cfm/publicationID/7a2d92f8-bb88-4336-9965-79125ed375cf/fuseaction/publication.detail
(discussing the Seff appellate case).
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B. The Safe Harbor Provision and the Unresolved Issue of Voluntariness
Obfuscate Otherwise Legitimate Discrimination Claims Under the ADA
The broad exemption in the ADA for wellness programs opens the door to
discrimination against obese employees who may be disparately impacted by
penalties for not meeting supposedly voluntary wellness program
requirements. 149 Because the five factors necessary to exempt a wellness
program from ADA regulations were interpreted broadly in Seff, it is relatively
easy for wellness programs to qualify for a safe harbor exemption. Therefore,
obese individuals who either choose not to participate or do participate but do
not meet certain requirements may be penalized based on their weight, which is
a condition that is increasingly covered under the ADA.150 As a result, the safe
harbor provision of the ADA may serve as a shelter for employers who create a
system of discrimination against obese employees. 151 These employees will
have limited recourse because the discrimination takes place under the broad and
largely undefined umbrella of ADA-exempt “voluntary” wellness programs.152
149. See Baird, supra note 129, at 1482–83, 1492, 1495 (discussing how the judicial and
legislative journey in defining the boundaries of wellness programs as penalties has only begun,
and how implementation of these programs “could exacerbate” economic disparity); see also Sarah
Ritz, The Need for Parity in Health Insurance Benefits for the Mentally and Physically Disabled:
Questioning Inconsistency Between Two Leading Anti-Discrimination Laws, 18 J.L. & HEALTH
263, 294 (2003–04) (“The safe harbor provision disturbs the statutory framework by exempting
traditional, discriminatory insurance practice from Title 1 constraints. It was not included in the
original bill but was later added ‘to reassure the insurance industry and other covered entities that
the ADA would not disturb current insurance underwriting practices.’”) (citing H. Miriam Farber,
Note, Subterfuge: Do Coverage Limitations and Exclusions in Employer-Provided Health Care
Plans Violate the Americans with Disabilities Act?, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 850, 861, 916 (1994)). For
a discussion on how those considered disabled under the ADA can be discriminated against, see
Shuman, supra note 79, at 561. Shuman discussed how the employers’ and insurers’ “burden” to
satisfy safe-harbor requirements for their programs is “not very high.” Id. Shuman illustrated this
with a discussion about an insurer charging higher rates against a person with AIDS, and an
administrator treating mental disabilities differently than other disabilities as long as there is “sound
actuarial data.” Id.
150. See Baird, supra note 129, at 1482, 1487 (overviewing the five factors, and the two
requirements needed for wellness programs to fall within the safe harbor provision); see generally
Jennifer Dianne Thomas, Mandatory Wellness Programs: A Plan to Reduce Heath Care Costs or
a Subterfuge to Discriminate Against Overweight Employees?, 53 HOW. L.J. 513, 514–15 (2010)
(opining that penalties allocated with wellness programs could discriminatorily target overweight
individuals who otherwise do not have health issues that average weight persons may have).
151. See Ritz, supra note 149, at 275 (“The safe harbor provision . . . provides [that,] . . .
[e]ssentially, as long as a disabled person is disabled enough to produce a real financial risk, they
can be discriminated against.”); but see Ziegler, supra note 146, at 849 (noting that Congress’ intent
for the safe harbor provision was not for it to be a “trump card” to permit discrimination, but to
make sure that the insurance industry for the self-insured was not disrupted). See S. REP. NO. 101116, at 850 (1989) (Conf. Rep.) (intending to limit the reach of insurers and employers by requiring
that they present sound actuarial evidence to support differential treatment of employees).
152. See H.R. REP. NO. 101-485, pt. 2, at 75 (1990) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 1990
U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 357 (stating that programs that are voluntary and abide by confidentiality
regulations are acceptable activities); ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE, supra note 29, at Q.22 (pointing
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The presumption of voluntariness in Seff and the EEOC’s conflicting
definition of “voluntary” set the stage for increased ADA litigation involving
obese employees.153 The Seff court did not hold that a twenty-dollar surcharge
rendered a wellness program “involuntary” under the ADA, despite the EEOC’s
guidance that a wellness program is only “voluntary” if the employer neither
requires participation nor penalizes employees who do not participate. 154
Employers are increasingly using aggressive financial incentives to “push the
boundary between voluntary and coercive.”155 As employers up the ante, it will
become easier for employees to argue that they are being penalized for not
participating in a program or for participating but not meeting program
requirements, and these penalties may not only run afoul of the ADA’s
regulations on wellness programs but also increase the likelihood of a disparate
financial impact on obese employees.156
out that a program is voluntary if employees are not required to participate or not penalized for not
doing so); ADA & GINA: Incentives for Workplace Wellness Programs, U.S. EQUAL EMP.
OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION (June 24, 2011), http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/foia/letters/2011/
ada_gina_incentives.html (stating that the Commission has not taken an official position regarding
what extent employers are permitted to offer incentives to participate in wellness programs); Baird,
supra note 129, at 1490–91 (explaining that until incentives for participating in wellness programs
are defined, determining the legality of programs is a “highly subjective” standard, and that a clear
line defining the ADA’s ability to narrow the scope of wellness programs has not yet been defined
by courts); see also Joseph J. Lazzarotti, An Introduction to Wellness Programs: The Legal
Implications of “Bona Fide Wellness Programs,” 6 BENDER’S LAB. & EMP. BULL. 270, 274 (2006)
(explaining that it is unclear whether, and to what extent, incentives abrogate voluntariness but
maintaining that employees may try to challenge wellness programs).
153. See Baird, supra note 129, at 1492 (“Perhaps because of the relatively small $20 penalty
for non-participation the court in Seff assumed voluntariness without explicitly addressing it.”); see
also ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE, supra note 29, at Q.22 (noting the voluntariness requirement).
154. See supra notes 122–23 and accompanying text.
155. Baird, supra note 129, at 1490. Penn State University’s wellness program has recently
garnered much attention for being overly intrusive in its employees’ lives. Natasha Singer, Health
Plan Penalty Ends at Penn State, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 18, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/
2013/09/19/business/after-uproar-penn-state-suspends-penalty-fee-in-wellness-plan.html.
The
university imposed a one-hundred dollar monthly fee on employees who chose not to fill out a
questionnaire about their jobs, marital situation, finances, and, for females, whether she planned to
become pregnant. Id. Penn State adopted a wellness program at the suggestion of its health care
claim administrator. Id. The president decided to suspend the fee after uproar from faculty and
staff regarding the privacy intrusion and the punitive nature of the program. Id.; see also Tom
Emerick & Al Lewis, The Danger of Wellness Programs: Don’t Become the Next Penn State,
HARV. BUS. REV. BLOG NETWORK (Aug. 20, 2013), http://blogs.hbr.org/2013/08/attention-humanresources-exec/ (suggesting to employers that making employees answer intrusive questions should
be avoided, and that offers should be made as incentives to answer such questions).
156. See Baird, supra note 129, at 1489–91 (noting that “as the incentive differential is
permitted to increase, so does the likelihood that a court would strike down a program as
incompatible with the ADA.”); see also Natasha Singer, Rules Sought for Workplace Wellness
Questionnaires, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 24, 2013, at B3, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2013/
09/25/business/rules-sought-for-workplace-wellness-questionnaires.html?_r=0 (reporting that
lawmakers are encouraging the EEOC to issue guidelines on how far employers may stretch the
term “voluntary”); Michelle M. Mello & Meredith B. Rosenthal, Wellness Programs and Lifestyle
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IV. CONCLUSION
The rise of wellness programs in the workplace is a positive development
because of the improvement in employee health and the potential lowering of
medical costs. However, these programs are breeding grounds for a rise in
discrimination claims under the ADA. As the obesity epidemic grows and courts
increasingly categorize obesity as a disability,157 the decision in Seff has set the
stage for an influx of discrimination claims in the context of employer wellness
programs.158 The Seff decision is in discord with courts’ increasing leniency in
ADA cases159 by categorizing any potential discrimination claim as an exception
to the ADA under the safe harbor provision. The Seff court’s decision, by
interpreting the safe harbor provision of the ADA too broadly and ignoring the
requirement that wellness programs be voluntary, undermined the broad
protection for individuals with disabilities, in particular obese individuals, 160
under the ADA.

Discrimination—The Legal Limits, 359 NEW ENG. J. MED. 192, 197 (2008), available at
http://www.hsph.harvard.edu/wp-content/uploads/sites/487/2012/10/Wellness_paper_PDF.pdf
(recommending that the voluntary nature of participation should be emphasized by employers to
garner support of a program’s legality in light of the dearth of case law defining voluntariness).
157. See Jennifer Vallor, Gut Check: Why Obesity Is Not a Disability Under Tennessee Law
and How the Legislature Can Address the Obesity Epidemic, 9 TENN. J.L & POL’Y. 265, 283 (2013)
(noting that after the ADA 2008 Amendments, federal courts have begun to recognize obesity as a
disability); see also Laura C. Hoffman, The U.S. Supreme Court’s “Disability” in Statutory
Construction: the Debate Over the Interpretation of the Definition of “Disability Under the
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) & the ADA Amendments Act of 2008, 14 SCHOLAR 913, 943
(2012) (positing that if obesity becomes an accepted disability, claims will increase).
158. See supra Part III.
159. See supra Part I.B.
160. See, e.g., Steven C. Sizemore, A Fatter Butt Equals a Skinnier Wallet: Why Workplace
Wellness Programs Discriminate Against the Obese and Violate Federal Employment Law, 11
WYO. L. REV. 639, 660–61 (2011).
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